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ethics

Do Two Wrongs Protect a
Prosecutor?
BY PETER A. JOY AND
KEVIN C. McMUNIGAL

M

ay a former criminal defendant bring
a civil rights action against a prosecutor who fabricated evidence during an
investigation and then introduced that evidence
against the defendant at trial? The Seventh and
Second Circuits have divided in answering this
question. On November 4, 2009, the Supreme
Court heard oral argument in an Eighth Circuit
case raising this question, Pottawattamie County
v. Harrington, 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (April 20, 2009), and
many expected the Court to resolve the circuit
split later this term. But on January 4, 2010, the
Court dismissed the case and the lawyers announced a $12 million settlement. Lower federal
courts outside the Second and Seventh Circuits
will thus continue to have to choose between two
strikingly different approaches to the prosecutorial immunity question that was central to the
Pottawattamie case.

Case Background

A jury convicted the plaintiffs in Pottawattamie
County of the murder of a security guard at an
Iowa car dealership, based largely on the testimony of a 16-year-old cooperating witness with
a long criminal record. The trial judge sentenced
the defendants to life imprisonment. In 2003, the
Iowa Supreme Court overturned the convictions
due to the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). The state’s primary witness
recanted, saying he lied to gain reward money
and avoid being charged himself with the security
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guard’s murder.
Both the trial and appellate court opinions describe in detail serious allegations concerning the
key witness’s testimony. In regard to bias, he had
several incentives to lie: a $5,000 reward, avoiding being charged with murder, and receiving help
from the prosecutor with other charges pending
against him. He implicated the plaintiffs only after prompting by the defendant prosecutors. The
witness also made many inconsistent statements,
changing his “story” multiple times and implicating other people before implicating the plaintiffs.
In regard to veracity, several of the statements
he made prior to implicating the plaintiffs were
known to be demonstrably false. In addition, he
lacked knowledge of important details of the
crime. For example, he first stated the guard had
been killed with a pistol, then with a 20-gauge
shotgun, and finally, after being told a 12-gauge
shell had been found at the crime scene, with a
12-gauge shotgun. The plaintiffs alleged that,
aware of these weaknesses, the defendants coerced this malleable witness into implicating the
plaintiffs, both African American and neither local residents, and exonerating the initial primary
suspect, a local white man. The defendant prosecutors then introduced the testimony at trial, resulting in conviction.

Ethics Provisions

Regardless of whether immunity shields a prosecutor from a civil rights suit, the misconduct alleged in such cases, if proven, typically violates a
number of ethics rules. Fabricating evidence and
counseling or assisting a witness to testify falsely
violates Model Rule 3.4(b). Offering fabricated
testimony knowing it to be false violates Model
Rule 3.3(a)(3). Pursuing a case based on fabricated evidence violates Model Rule 3.8(a), and failure to reveal exculpatory evidence violates Model
Rule 3.8(d).
In addition to these specific ethics rules, it is a
violation of Model Rule 8.4(a) to violate an ethics
rule by knowingly assisting or inducing another
to do so, or to do so through the acts of another. Thus, a prosecutor who advises the police to
falsify evidence is ethically culpable. Rule 8.4(d)
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Falsifying evidence or using false evidence could easily
qualify as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
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Prosecutorial Immunity

A key issue in the Pottawattamie County case is
whether the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity or qualified immunity in relation to the alleged fabrication misconduct. Absolute immunity,
as the phrase suggests, insulates the prosecutor
from civil liability even if the prosecutor engaged
in the alleged misconduct. If absolute immunity
applies, a case against a prosecutor is terminated
at a very early point, often through summary judgment. Under qualified immunity, by contrast, the
prosecutor has immunity only for discretionary actions that do not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” (Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).) If qualified immunity is
applicable, a case is likely to proceed to discovery
and possibly to trial to determine the factual issues
presented by that defense.
The seminal Supreme Court case dealing with
prosecutor immunity is Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976). In Imbler and its progeny, the
most recent of which is Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,
129 S. Ct. 855 (2009), the Supreme Court has held
that whether a prosecutor has absolute immunity
or qualified immunity depends both on the type
of task the prosecutor is performing and when
that task occurs. If the task entails advocacy, absolute immunity is granted. For example, in its recent Van de Kamp opinion, the Court stated that
absolute immunity attaches “when a prosecutor
prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding” or “appears in court to present evidence in support of a
search warrant application.” (Id. at 861.)
If the prosecutor’s task when the alleged misconduct occurred involves investigation or administration, then qualified immunity applies. As
examples of conduct to which qualified immunity applies, the Van de Kamp Court pointed to
a prosecutor making statements to the press or
acting “as a complaining witness in support of a
warrant application.” (Id.)
Timing helps distinguish advocacy from investigation and administration and thus is a factor
in marking the line between absolute and qualified immunity. The Court has indicated that advocacy cannot occur prior to the establishment of
probable cause to arrest. “A prosecutor neither is,
nor should consider himself to be, an advocate
before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.” (Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
274 (1993).)

Policy Concerns

A major theme in the Imbler line of cases is the array of pragmatic policy concerns raised by immunity for prosecutors. The possibility of being held
personally liable would create a conflict of interest for prosecutors, tempting them not to prosecute valid cases out of fear of being subjected to
a later lawsuit. Without immunity, limited public
resources in the form of prosecutor time and energy would be diverted from pursuing criminals
to defending themselves in lawsuits. Another concern is that without immunity, the number of invalid cases raising spurious claims of wrongdoing
might overwhelm prosecutorial resources.
In response, those hostile to prosecutorial immunity point out that absolute immunity leaves
those genuinely wronged by prosecutor misconduct without compensation for often substantial
injuries. Prosecutorial immunity also undermines
specific and general deterrence of prosecutorial
wrongdoing, the frequency and severity of which
have been illustrated by many highly publicized
wrongful convictions in recent decades. Prosecutorial immunity may also discourage supervisory
prosecutors from monitoring the conduct of line
prosecutors.
Proponents of prosecutorial immunity counter
the claim that absolute prosecutorial immunity
undermines deterrence of prosecutorial wrongdoing by arguing that the threat of ethical disciplinary sanctions fills the deterrence gap. Critics
of prosecutorial immunity respond by pointing to the dramatic under-enforcement of ethics rules against prosecutors across the country.
The plaintiffs in the Pottawattamie County case,
for example, pointed out in their Supreme Court
brief that, despite the fact that the Iowa Supreme
Court found that the defendants in the case had
violated their duty under Brady v. Maryland,
and thus violated Iowa’s version of Model Rule
3.8(d), the prosecutors were not even investigated
for ethical discipline much less disciplined.

Investigation or Advocacy?

The distinction between advocacy and investigation is central to resolution of the central question posed in the Pottawattamie County case. On
which side of this line does the plaintiffs’ fabrication charge fall? The trial court found that qualified immunity applied to the defendants’ conduct
prior to the filing of charges, but that absolute immunity applied to the allegations that they failed
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to disclose exculpatory evidence and coerced additional “jailhouse informant” witnesses after
the filing of charges. (McGhee v. Pottawattamie
County, 475 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2007).)
The Eighth Circuit affirmed both of these conclusions. (McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547
F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008).)
The Eighth Circuit’s affirmance is consistent
with the Second Circuit opinion of Judge Jon O.
Newman in Zahrey v. Coffee, 221 F.3d 342 (2d
Cir. 2000), and at odds with the Seventh Circuit
opinion of Judge Frank Easterbrook in Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). Despite the fact that the alleged fabrications in Zahrey and Buckley took place while the prosecutors
were acting as investigators, the cases disagree on
whether such a fabrication constituted a constitutional violation. Judge Easterbrook found that it
did not, while Judge Newman found that it did.
Judge Easterbrook offered several arguments
in support of his conclusion in favor of the defendant prosecutors in Buckley. He noted that “the
exchange of money for information” as well as
police and prosecutors making “promises to go
easy” with witnesses in return for cooperation are
commonplace and do not in and of themselves
violate the Constitution. He also noted that coercion of a witness violates the witness’s constitutional rights, but not the rights of another person
whom the coerced witness implicates. The implicated person’s rights are violated only if and when
such coerced testimony is used against the defendant in a judicial proceeding. Such use by a prosecutor at trial constitutes advocacy and qualifies
for absolute immunity. When the same prosecutor
creates fabricated evidence during an investigation and then uses it at trial, Judge Easterbrook
placed the “location” of the constitutional violation in the advocacy phase of the case and thus
subject to absolute immunity.
In support of this “location” assessment, Judge
Easterbrook offered a causation analysis. If a
prosecutor fabricates evidence in the investigative
phase and then introduces that evidence at trial,
Judge Easterbrook saw the subsequent wrongful use at trial as a superseding act breaking the
chain of causation between the investigative fabrication and the plaintiff’s ultimate loss of liberty.
Easterbrook found that this break in the causal
chain effectively insulates the prosecutor from liability for the original fabrication while absolute
immunity shields the prosecutor from liability for

using the fabricated evidence at trial. In essence,
in Judge Easterbrook’s view, a second wrong of
using fabricated evidence at trial protects a prosecutor from liability for a prior wrong of fabricating the evidence.
Judge Newman, writing for a unanimous Second Circuit panel, disagreed both with Judge
Easterbrook’s reasoning and the result to which it
leads, as had Judge Fairchild of the Seventh Circuit in dissenting from Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Buckley. Both Judge Newman and Judge
Fairchild concluded that a defendant does state a
constitutional claim if he or she can show that the
prosecutor’s investigatory fabrication caused the
defendant to be charged and tried.
Judge Newman found that “the manufacture
of false evidence” by any governmental official
is a due process violation. Citing the language of
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, he agreed
with Judge Easterbrook that such a due process
violation is not actionable unless it causes a deprivation of liberty.
Unlike Judge Easterbrook, though, Judge
Newman did not find that the prosecutor’s use
of the fabricated evidence at trial broke the
causal chain from the earlier fabrication and
insulated the prosecutor from liability for that
fabrication. In deciding that a prosecutor’s use
of fabricated evidence does not break the chain
of causation in this situation, Judge Newman
emphasized that such subsequent use was not a
truly independent act and that it was foreseeable
by the prosecutor at the time the evidence was
fabricated. He relied heavily on cases from the
Fifth and Second Circuits, each of which had rejected the sort of causation reasoning adopted
by Judge Easterbrook.
Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1984),
involved a mayor who was also an ex officio magistrate and municipal court judge. Acting as mayor,
the defendant investigated and in bad faith signed
a complaint against the plaintiff. The mayor then
issued an arrest warrant pursuant to which the
plaintiff was arrested. The mayor acted in a judicial capacity and was thus entitled to absolute
immunity for issuance of the arrest warrant. But
the Fifth Circuit concluded that he could nonetheless be held liable for his earlier nonjudicial investigative acts and swearing out of the criminal
complaint, neither of which were within absolute
immunity. The Thomas court specifically rejected
the defendant’s argument that his immunized ju-
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dicial act of issuing the arrest warrant broke the
causal chain between his bad faith swearing out
of the criminal complaint and the plaintiff’s arrest. Because both acts were done by the same
person, there was no “independent decision” of
the sort that may break a causal chain. In short,
the court found that the defendant “may not inoculate” his earlier wrongful conduct by a “pen
stroke” in issuing the arrest warrant.
White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988),
presented the same causation question of whether
the causal chain between a government official’s
wrongful conduct and a plaintiff’s loss of liberty
is severed by a later wrongful act by the same official. In White, a police officer provided false testimony as a complaining witness, then repeated
that false testimony as an ordinary witness. He
had absolute immunity as an ordinary witness,
but not as a complaining witness. The Second
Circuit in White rejected the argument that the
officer’s immunized testimony broke the causal
chain stemming from his earlier wrongful con-

able. Judge Newman reasoned that “[i]t would be
a perverse doctrine of tort and constitutional law
that would hold liable the fabricator of evidence
who hands it to an unsuspecting prosecutor but
exonerate the wrongdoer who enlists himself in a
scheme to deprive a person of liberty.” (Zahrey v.
Coffee, 221 F.3d at 353.)

Our View

We hope federal courts that confront this issue in
the future recognize the analysis and reasoning of
Judge Newman in Zahrey and Judge Fairchild’s
dissent in Buckley, as well as the analogous reasoning and analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Thomas and the Second Circuit in White, as both more
persuasive and more pragmatic than that used by
Judge Easterbrook in Buckley.
The prosecutor who intentionally fabricates
evidence in the investigative stage is clearly blameworthy and dangerous. If that prosecutor then
knowingly uses that fabricated evidence to indict
and convict a defendant, the prosecutor commits

The prosecutor who intentionally fabricates
evidence in the investigative stage is blameworthy.
If he or she then uses that evidence to convict,
that prosecutor is dangerous.
duct. The court refused to allow the defendant in
White effectively “to transpose the immunity” of
an ordinary witness onto his prior acts as a complaining witness.
In rejecting the Easterbrook causation analysis, Judge Newman in Zahrey noted that a government official who fabricated evidence—whether a
police officer or a prosecutor—would not escape
liability if he or she then provided that fabricated
evidence to an unsuspecting prosecutor who in
good faith used it to wrongfully convict someone.
Under the Easterbrook analysis, a prosecutor acting in bad faith as an advocate who uses fabricated evidence the prosecutor previously created
could insulate himself or herself from liability for
the investigative misconduct while the police officer or prosecutor who handed fabricated evidence
to an unsuspecting prosecutor would remain li-

additional blameworthy and dangerous acts. Prosecutors argue every day at sentencings throughout
the country that repeated criminal acts are more
deserving of punishment and show greater need
for deterrence than isolated crimes. Similarly, the
use of fabricated evidence in cases such as Pottawattamie County aggravates the prosecutor’s
blameworthiness and danger, increasing both the
retributive and deterrent justifications for imposing monetary liability. Under Judge Easterbrook’s
approach, though, the blameworthy and dangerous acts of using fabricated evidence to indict and
again to convict has the odd effect of insulating
the prosecutor from civil liability for the earlier
wrongful conduct of fabricating evidence. If two
wrongs don’t make a right, neither should they
protect a prosecutor from answering for wrongdoing. n
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